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Abstract
At the time when at least two-thirds of the US states have already mandated
some form of seller’s property condition disclosure statement and there is a move-
ment in this direction nationally, this paper examines the impact of seller’s prop-
erty condition disclosure law on the residential real estate values, the information
asymmetry in housing transactions and shift of risk from buyers and brokers to
the sellers, and attempts to ascertain the factors that lead to adoption of the dis-
closur law. The analytical structure employs parametric panel data models, semi-
parametric propensity score matching models, and an event study framework us-
ing a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a quarterly panel of
291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 50 US States spanning 21
years from 1984 to 2004. Exploiting the MSA level variation in house prices, the
study finds that the average seller may be able to fetch a higher price (about three
to four percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated seller’s property
condition disclosure statement to the buyer.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C14, K11, L85, R21
Keywords: Property Condition Disclosure, Housing Price Index, Propensity
Score Matching Event Study
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1 Introduction 
Home buying arena has changed from the time when ‘caveat emptor’ or ‘buyers beware’ was the 
buzzword. Previously, the onus was placed wholly on the buyer for any defects in the property
3
. 
There were lawsuits against the real estate agents or the seller in the aftermath of the sales for 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material defects. The case closely resembles that of used 
car sales. The dealer (or the seller) has better information about the condition of the car (or the 
property) than the buyer can possibly have. This information asymmetry in property market was 
brought into public attention by the path-breaking 1984 California appellate court verdict, which 
made the case for requiring a seller's disclosure statement in residential real estate transactions
4
. 
 
This paper analyzes the effect of information transparency and the shift of risk from buyers and 
brokers to the sellers due to adoption of the law on property values. The analytical structure 
employs parametric dynamic panel data models, semi-parametric propensity score matching 
models, and an event study framework using a unique and rich set of economic and institutional 
attributes for a quarterly panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 50 US 
States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004 to address the research question. Analyzing the MSA 
level variation in Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) Housing Price 
Indices, we find robust positive effect of the seller’s property condition disclosure law on 
property values.  
 
The study contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, it tests and supports the 
generally held claim by the brokers and scholars about the positive effect of the mandate on 
property values. Second, the paper provides a framework and makes the case for empirical 
                                                 
3
 “What is a Seller's Disclosure?” Dian Hymer, October 1, 2001. Distributed by Inman News 
Features. 
4
 Easton v. Strassburger (152 Cal.App.3d 90, 1984) was a California Appellate Court decision 
that expanded the duty of realtors and the grounds for realtor negligence in selling faulty homes. 
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analyses for evaluating the policy statutes in the field of law and economics. Third, thirty-six US 
states have already enacted some form of seller’s property condition disclosure law. Finding a 
positive effect of the law on property values along with the other favorable effects on different 
aspects of the residential real estate transactions and real estate business environment, the paper 
bolsters the recommendation of adopting disclosure laws in the states and countries, which are yet 
to enact such mandates. It provides of course another evidence of disclosure statement in 
reducing the cost of uncertainty stemming from the presence of asymmetric information. 
 
In the past fifteen years, numerous legal proceedings have brought greater transparency in 
property transactions. Not all states have seller disclosure as statutory requirements, although 
there is a movement in this direction nationally. Almost two-thirds of the US states now require 
sellers to disclose property condition in a state-mandated disclosure form. California was the first 
state to require a seller disclosure statement, called The Real Estate Transfer Disclosure 
Statement (TDS). Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s other states initiated some form of 
disclosure statement. The overall format of the statement differs considerably across states. The 
typical disclosure form asks for information on appliances, fixtures, and structural items etc. 
Generally, any known material defects (regarding the items) that are not readily apparent to a 
buyer, but known to the seller, should be disclosed
5
. Determining what is a material defect is not 
always clear. Sometimes an element of subjectivity is involved. In some states, title and zoning 
questions appear in the disclosure form. Often natural hazards (e.g. flood or earthquake-prone 
area) and environmental concerns (e.g. radon, lead, or asbestos exposure) are reflected in 
particular state-required disclosures. For instance, earthquake hazard disclosure is required in 
California, but not in New York or in most of the Midwest states.  
                                                 
5
 Lefcoe (2004) provides an excellent discussion on many different aspects of the property 
condition disclosure law. 
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Property condition disclosure statement is not a warranty of the unit’s condition
6
. It is rather a 
representation of the information about the property condition by the seller at the time of selling 
the house. Scholars argue that the seller-provided inspection is not a substitute for the seller 
disclosure form since many material defects may not be revealed by an inspector
7
. For example, 
inspectors are not supposed to inspect for rodents, or check the walls, foundation, the air-
conditioning, and heating system, or know about flooding, and many other potential areas for 
material defects.  
 
There have been a number of studies on the property condition disclosure law and its implications 
on different aspects of residential real estate market. The studies (Pancak, Miceli and Sirmans 
(1996), Moore and Smolen (2000), Zumpano and Johnson (2003), and Lefcoe (2004)) suggest a 
positive impact of the law on property values, buyer’s satisfaction, broker’s avoidance of risk etc. 
The economic implication of this requirement can be manifold. Most importantly, the seller's 
disclosure statement directly affects the information asymmetry in real estate transactions. It 
provides better transparency in property transactions, and facilitates the buyer's decision-making 
process.  
 
Using data on the claims against errors and omissions insurance by the real estate licensees for 
five states, Zumpano and Johnson (2003) find that “… fully 76% of all suits against real estate 
salespeople had something to do with the condition of the property being sold”
8
. The seller's 
disclosure statement protects both the buyer and the seller from possible disputes in the aftermath 
of the transaction. It also prevents any misplaced liability on the seller and the broker who 
represents the seller. Thus, it can be viewed as a tool to avoid lawsuits, which are viewed as 
                                                 
6
 See Lefcoe (2004) pg. 212-213. 
7
 See Lefcoe (2004) pg. 239. 
8
 Not all states require real estate salesperson to carry Errors & Omissions (E&O) insurance 
coverage. 
  5 
deadweight losses to some extent
9
. The disclosure statement shifts risk from the real estate buyers 
and brokers to the sellers. As noted by Pancak et al. (1996), brokers face a potential liability for 
failure to disclose by sellers, as well as their own failure to discover defects. Therefore, it makes 
economic sense to impose the duty of conducting inspection on brokers. However, the cost of this 
inspection might be incorporated in the brokerage commission. Thus, it may have impacts on the 
broker's commission structure
10
. It was the interest of the brokers to have a mandate in place on 
this issue. The National Association of Realtors (NAR), which is a major trade association of real 
estate agents, lobbied for the disclosure law and brought about the mandate in many states in 
early 1990s. There is a question about whether seller disclosure should be mandated by statute or 
not
11
. The most obvious argument for a statute is that it ensures widespread adherence to the 
mandate. The high rate of compliance is important in achieving the goal of any disclosure 
statement.  
 
The literature strongly argues that the disclosure law can potentially be one of the factors behind 
appreciation of property values. Primarily, the positive effect comes from the buyer’s satisfaction 
with the home she is buying. The quality assurance about what a seller is selling from the written 
disclosure may aid in convincing the buyer to agree on a higher bid price
12
. Based on the 
interviews of a group of homebuyers before the enactment of the disclosure law in Ohio, and a 
comparable group after the law adoption, Moore and Smolen (2000) find that the customer 
dissatisfaction dropped from the pre-disclosure level. In the absence of a disclosure statement (i.e. 
                                                 
9
 Zumpano and Johnson (2003) conclude: “There seems to be little question that the property 
condition disclosure, whether mandatory or voluntary, can reduce error and omission claims 
against real estate licensees”. 
10
 The average commission for real estate brokers declined from about 6.1 percent in 1991 to 
about 5.1 percent in 2004. Source: “What you need to know about commission rates”, Kelly A. 
Spors, Sept. 20, 2004; The Wall Street Journal Online. 
11
 See Lefcoe (2004) pg. 228. 
12
 Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty, (2003), “Mandatory versus Voluntary 
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers”, Journal of Law Economics 
and Organization, 19, finds that generally informed consumers pay more for higher quality 
products. 
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in the presence of asymmetric information), the rational buyers would discount the bid price due 
to the uncertainty associated with the property condition
13
. Following Akerlof’s theory of the 
market for ‘lemons’, in the absence of asymmetric information, the average price for good quality 
homes would be higher than the price in the presence of asymmetric information, as the cost of 
uncertainty is partly eliminated (or at least reduced) by the disclosure statement
14
. Moreover, 
customer satisfaction is all too important from the real estate business point of view. Lefcoe 
(2004) rightly points out that the brokers do care about customer satisfaction due to the potential 
referral effect from the satisfied customers. The two major factors that possibly induced interest 
by realtors in switching from the regime of ‘Caveat Emptor’ to ‘Seller Tell All’ are the avoidance 
of risk and the customer satisfaction.  
 
A secondary positive impact of the disclosure statement is on the quality of houses up for sale. 
Previously, a seller could strike a deal without fixing some of the less expensive problems with 
the property. In order to furnish a disclosure statement, and to avoid a possible decline in the bid 
price for the house, the seller may at least undertake the inexpensive repairs. This may have a 
positive impact on the property values
15
. However, as Lefcoe (2004) observes, the disclosure law 
would also prevent sellers to make a house more saleable by painting over or covering up 
evidence of serious defects.  
 
We can identify two broad areas, which may entail variation in house price indices. First, due to 
appreciation in values for the properties reported to be in good condition, the house price index 
should reflect a positive impact of the disclosure law. Second, disclosure may reduce the price 
index due to the revelation of ‘lemons’ in the market. This makes the case for an empirically 
                                                 
13
 See Lefcoe (2004) pg. 217. 
14
 See “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, by George 
A. Akerlof, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Aug., 1970), 488-500. 
15
 Lefcoe (2004) observes: “Understandably, buyers seek price reduction to offset the costs of 
repairing disclosed defects. By the same token, buyers pay more for homes free of defects.” 
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testable hypothesis:  What effects do state-mandated seller's disclosure statements have on 
residential real estate values? There have been no detailed empirical studies, to our knowledge
16
. 
Examining the research question helps in our understanding of the law, and indicates whether the 
objectives of the law are fulfilled, and the mandate should be adopted nation-wide. 
 
Rest of the study proceeds as follows; Section 3 discusses the parametric panel estimation 
methods and semi-parametric approaches, Section 4 provides the description of the economic and 
institutional variables, Section 5 analyzes, compares, and contrasts the results from different 
econometric models, and finally, we conclude in Section 6. 
 
2 Methodology 
At the onset of empirical analysis of the disclosure law, we face the choice between treating the 
adoption of the law as a one-time shock or a persistent shock to the housing market. Since the 
treatment is a statute, it does not change status every period. This is especially true for the 
disclosure law, as it has not been repealed in any state since its inception. The effect of the shock 
stays over the years until it is internalized throughout the economy, which is the case as there are 
still quite a few states, which do not require such disclosure statement.  
 
Moreover, there is a lag involved in the effect of the law to be felt across the state. This implies 
that the effect would be less pronounced in the current period of the adoption than in the future 
periods. The rational buyer would gradually start believing in the effectiveness of the law in 
bringing about the much-desired transparency in property transactions. The initial skepticism will 
go away as the buyer updates (reduces) the extent of discounting of the bid price due to the 
presence of uncertainty. Figure (1) provides a diagrammatic exposition on the slow adjustment 
                                                 
16
 Although Zumpano and Johnson (2003) use empirical facts to analyze the impact of the law on 
claims against errors and omissions insurance, no empirical modeling was conducted, and the 
study is limited to only five states. 
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(dotted line in the figure) in buyers’ perception of the effectiveness of the disclosure law. In order 
to test the length of the slow adjustment empirically, we use specifications with different lengths 
of duration of the shock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Movement of Housing Price Index at the level 
 
2.1 Parametric Approaches to Ascertain the Effect on Property Values 
2.1.1 Simple Panel Estimation: 
        In this section, we index i as MSAs, j as States, t as quarter-year, s as year, and ωt as the 
quarter-year (year) fixed effect. σi (σj) is the MSA (State) fixed effect. Yt is the outcome variable 
(Housing Price Index (HPI)); Xit is a vector of economic characteristics of the MSA; Zjt is a 
vector of economic and institutional characteristics of the state; εit is the error term. Xit includes: 
an indicator variable for the law adoption, seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, job growth 
rate, percent change in per capita income, percent change in per capita Gross Metropolitan 
Product (or Gross State Product for state level analysis), and percent change in population
17
. Zjt 
includes four indicator variables controlling for the political make-up of the state partisan control 
                                                 
17
 These economic controls are standard in the literature on housing price volatility. See Miller 
and Peng (2005). 
HPI 
Level 
Time t   t+1  t-2 t-1   t+3  t+2   t-3     t-4   t+4 
Slow Adjustment of the Buyers’ Perception 
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(democratic control with democratic governor, democratic control with republican governor 
(omitted category), republican control with republican governor, and republican control with 
democratic governor
18
), number of real estate licensees per one thousand population, number of 
complaints against real estate licensees, number of disciplinary actions taken against real estate 
licensees, licensee supervision index
19
, and mortgage rate. We include the state-level institutional 
characteristics to control for the fact that they might be correlated with the unobservables, which 
affect the housing prices directly. We do not expect these controls to have direct causality with 
the dependent variable. 
 
itjtitit
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                                                                (1) 
ittjtitit ZXy εωβα +++=                                                                                                (2) 
ittjjtitit ZXy εωσβα ++++=                                                                                          (3) 
ittijtitit ZXy εωσβα ++++=                                                                                           (4) 
 
Equation (1) is the baseline OLS regression
20
. However, there may be time period specific effects 
in the variation of HPI. So, In Equation (2), we allow for quarter-year fixed effects. Moreover, 
variation in HPI may be affected by state-specific factors. Therefore, equation (3) allows for both 
quarter-year and state fixed effects. Equation (4) allows for quarter-year and MSA fixed effects 
instead. This specification implicitly contains state effects since we drop the cross-state MSAs. 
                                                 
18
 See de Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh (2004) for detail discussion on these partisan control 
variables. 
19
 The supervision index is defined as the percentage of active brokers to total active licensees. 
The assumption is that greater supervision can be captured by greater percentage of brokers to 
licensees. See Pancak and Sirmans (2005) for discussion on this control.   
20
 For all parametric estimation, we report clustered standard errors. See Bertrand, Duflo, 
Mullainathan (2002) and Kezdi (2003) for detail discussion on estimation with robust clustered 
standard error. 
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Equations (2) through (4) do not impose any assumption about the serial correlation in error 
structure. However, in the current context, especially the unobservables related to institutional 
structure of cross-sectional units may persist over time. This warrants assumptions regarding 
serially correlated error structure. Therefore, in equation (5), we employ first differencing method 
instead of previous strategy of mean differencing to control for the cross-section fixed effects
21
.   
 
ittjtitit ZXy εωβα ∆+∆+∆+∆=∆                                                                                            (5) 
 
We estimate equations (1) through (4) with heteroscedasticity-robust standard error. However, as 
noted in Slottje, Millimet, and Buchanan (2005), feasible GLS is more efficient than simply using 
pooled OLS with robust standard errors if the error structure is well specified. Since we are 
leaving room for specifying the error structure in equation (5), we estimate it by iterative feasible 
GLS procedure. We try a few different specifications for the error structure. First, we allow a 
time effect, and specify the variance of the residual to be panel-specific. With this specification, 
we try three different explicit assumptions for the error structure:  no autocorrelation, same AR(1) 
across panels, and panel-specific AR(1). Next, we specify the variance of the residual to be panel-
specific as before, but we allow for both time and MSA effects, and impose similar assumptions 
about serial autocorrelation as before.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 See Woolridge (2002), pg. 284-285 for detail discussion on this. First differenced estimator is 
more efficient when error term follows a random walk instead of serially uncorrelated error 
structure. 
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2.1.2 Dynamic Panel Estimation: 
         It is a standard practice in the literature on housing price analysis to control for the 
feedbacks from the past levels of house prices
22
. A competent method is the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimation for dynamic panel data model by Arellano and Bond (1991). As 
Slottje et al. (2005) argue that instead of allowing for autocorrelation in error structure, the 
Arellano and Bond GMM estimation explicitly allows past levels of the outcome of interest to 
affect current levels. First, the model sweeps away the cross-section effect by first differencing, 
and then uses second and higher order lags of the dependent variable as instruments for the 
endogenous first lagged dependent variable
23
. In the differenced model, the dependent variable 
(yit-yit-1) is correlated with (yit-1-yit-2) on the left hand side. However, assuming that we have a long 
enough time series, we could use lagged differences, (yit-2-yit-3) and higher order lagged 
differences, or the lagged levels yit-2, yit-3, and higher orders as instruments for (yit-1-yit-2). Arellano 
et al. and Ahn and Schmidt (1995) propose a GMM estimation suggesting that we can gain 
efficiency by bringing in more information by using a larger set of moment conditions. In the 
current context, our dependent variable is the percentage change in HPI. This implies that, to 
untie the correlations, we need to use further lagged dependent variables as instrument. In similar 
vein, we employ dynamic panel estimation in the following manner.   
ittijtit
K
L
LitLit ZXyy εωσβαθ +++++= ∑
=
−
1
                                                 (6)  
 
Where ‘K’ is the lag length. Equation (6) is the baseline dynamic model. In this specification, by 
the very nature of our dependent variable, yit is correlated with yit-1. By first-differencing equation 
(6), we obtain the following model. 
                                                 
22
 Miller and Peng (2005) explain the volatility in house prices in a dynamic framework. 
23
 See Greene, William (2003), pg. 307-314, and 551-555 for details on this model. 
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ittjtit
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                                              (7) 
 
In equation (7), (yit-yit-1) is correlated with (yit-1-yit-2) and (yit-2-yit-3). This implies that, in order to 
maintain strict exogeneity in choosing instruments for the endogenous terms i.e. (yit-1-yit-2) and 
(yit-2-yit-3), we could use (yit-3- yit-4) and further lagged differences as instruments. However, the 
bias may still arise from the first stage OLS regression. In the first stage models, (yit-2-yit-3) is still 
correlated with (yit-3-yit-4) on the right-hand side. This implies that we need to modify the 
specifications for the first stage regression accordingly. Therefore, we should use (yit-3-yit-4) and 
onwards as instruments. This implies that our reduced form specification includes the dynamic 
terms (yit-3-yit-4) and higher ordered components. Finally, our structural estimation model is 
written as: 
 
ittjtitititit ZXyyy εωβαθθ ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ −− 2211 ˆˆ           (8) 
Where 1ˆ −ity  and 2ˆ −ity are the predicted values from the first stage estimations. We conduct over-  
identification tests for the structural models. We compare Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)    
and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SC) to choose the optimal number of lags
24
.  
 
2.2 Semi-Parametric Approaches to Ascertain the Effect on Property Values 
2.2.1 Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
Propensity score matching method developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) provides a 
competing approach to analyze the effect of a treatment (in our case, adoption of disclosure law) 
on an outcome variable (i.e. percentage change in HPI). It is generally used in many areas of 
                                                 
24
 However, SC has superior large sample properties than AIC. In large sample, the SC is 
asymptotically consistent while the AIC is biased toward selecting an overparameterized model. 
See Enders (2003), pg. 69-75 for details. 
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applied statistics, especially in medical trials with patient data. However, in recent years, 
propensity score method is being increasingly used in program evaluation literature in labor 
economics (Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), and Smith and Todd 
(2000)). The reasons why we use the propensity score approach to compare and contrast with the 
parametric estimation methods are three-fold, also noted in Slottje et al. (2005): First, the 
propensity score approach imposes fewer assumptions about the distribution of the data. Second, 
it permits non-parametric interactions among all the covariates in determining the outcome (i.e. 
selection on observables). Third, it ascertains the mean impact of treatment on the treated within a 
group of ‘very similar’ units. Parametric approaches consider all the units to infer on the effect. 
 
The motivation of the matching methods can be summarized as follows: In observational studies, 
the units are assigned to the treatment and control groups in a non-random manner
25
. Therefore, 
the estimates of the effect of treatment may contain biases from the selection on unobservables. 
Propensity score matching is based on the idea that the bias is reduced when the comparison of 
mean impact is performed using treated and control units, which are similar. Propensity score acts 
as an index on which the matching can be performed since it is generally not feasible to match on 
an n-dimensional vector of characteristics. A relevant application of the propensity score 
approach is provided by Slottje et al. (2005), which looks at the effect of logo change on 
franchise value and ticket sales for NFL teams. More formally, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
define the propensity score as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given a vector 
of pre-treatment characteristics: 
 
{ } { }ititit XlegalEXlegalXP ||1Pr)( ==≡                                                       (9)  
Where, legal= {0, 1} is the law adoption dummy, and Xit is a vector of pre-treatment attributes.   
                                                 
25
 See Becker and Ichino (2002). 
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Our parameter of interest is the mean effect of treatment (MET) on the treated units, which is 
defined as
26
: 
)0),(|(ˆ)(
1
0
1
11 =−= ∑
=
= legalXPyEXy
n
MET itit
n
i
iitlegal                                                       (10) 
Where, y1it is the percentage change in HPI with disclosure law and y0it is percent  
change in HPI without disclosure law.   
 
Typically, the matching algorithm (Becker and Ichino (2002)) is conducted as follows: First, we 
estimate a probit model to obtain the cumulative probability of adopting disclosure law. The 
predicted cumulative probability from the probit model is the propensity score. Then, we split the 
sample into five (or more) equally spaced intervals (or bins) of the propensity score. Within each 
bin, we test that the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ. If it 
differs, we split the interval more until the condition is satisfied. Next step is to test that the 
average characteristics do not differ between treated and control group in each bin. This implies 
that the balancing property is satisfied. The balancing property ensures that for a given propensity 
score, exposure to treatment is random, and thus, both groups are on average observationally 
equivalent i.e. both groups have the same distribution of observables as well as unobservables 
independently of the treatment status.  
 
Finally, we calculate the difference between average outcomes (i.e. percentage change in HPI) of 
the treated and the control units for each bin. For any bin ‘m’, 
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 See Todd (1999) for a discussion on this and other matching estimators. 
  15 
Where, ‘M’ is the total number of bins, 
d
mn  is the number of units which adopted disclosure law 
i.e. the treated group, and 
nd
mn  is the number of units which have not adopted disclosure law i.e. 
the control group in the m
th.
 bin.  
 
The difference can be thought of as the mean impact of adopting the law in each interval. To get 
the aggregate effect, we add up the weighted abnormal returns to get the Average effect of 
Treatment on Treated (ATT). We apply interval weights based on the number of observations in 
the interval when adding up the mean effects. 
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m MET
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1
                                                                                                         (12) 
Where, 
nd
m
d
mm nnn += = number of units in the m
th.
 bin. 
 
We try three different matching methods (following Becker and Ichino (2002)) to see the 
robustness of the treatment effects. First, the Stratification method executes the algorithm we 
described before. We discard the bins where we do not find either any control or treated units. 
Second, the Nearest Neighbor method involves taking each treated unit and finding the control 
units, which is closest in terms of magnitude of the propensity score. Therefore, by construction, 
each treated unit should have matches, which enables us to avoid the pitfall of discarding some 
bins in stratification method. However, some matches would be poor in quality. Third, the Kernel 
Matching method gets all treated units being matched with a weighted average of all control units 
where weights are calculated as inverse of the Euclidean distance between the propensity scores 
of the two groups. Therefore, it tackles the problem of poor matches from the nearest neighbor 
method. Each of these methods has some advantages and disadvantages. We compare the results 
from all three methods. 
  16 
We also try three different estimators for each of the above methods. First, we define the outcome 
variable to be the difference in average percentage change in HPI between treated and control 
units. Second, in order to control for the year-specific effect, we subtract year mean from the first 
estimator. Third, in line with Smith and Todd (2000), we define the outcome variable as a 
Difference-in-Difference (DID) in average percentage change in HPI between the two groups
27
. It 
is DID in the sense that we subtract a benchmark percentage change in HPI from the average 
percentage change in HPI. We choose the benchmark to be the percentage change in HPI from 
the pre-treatment time period. This strategy enables us to control for the cross section effect. We 
also de-mean the year effect for this estimator.  
 
2.2.2 Event Study Analysis 
In the propensity score matching estimation, the control unit may come from any of the periods in 
the sample. However, it may be desirable to find a matched control from the disclosure year or 
from the vicinity of that time period. To address this concern, we restrict the control unit to be 
obtained within one year of the law adoption. This is done in an event study approach where we 
calculate the abnormal return (AR) for each of the time periods in the event window (which we 
specify to be 4 years or 16 quarters before and after the event i.e. law adoption). One important 
advantage of the event study framework is that it allows us to focus on the disclosure law 
adoption date (i.e. the event date) to infer on the impact. Typically, the event study methodology 
is extensively used in analyzing the impact of earnings announcements (or, other information 
shocks) on the stock prices
28
. There are also quite a few studies, which address the issues related 
to corporate laws in this framework
29
. 
 
                                                 
27
 Smith and Todd (2000) requires the matches to come from the same labor market while 
evaluating employment programs. 
28
 See Campbell, Lo, and McKinley (1997), chapter 4 for an excellent discussion on the 
methodology. 
29
 See Bhagat and Romano (2001) for excellent discussions on the issues and methodologies.  
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Generally, the ARs are obtained as the deviation of the treatment unit’s outcome from a market 
index or a benchmark at each event dates. AR is the sample average abnormal return for the 
specified date in event time. In the current context, the ARs are obtained as the deviation of the 
treatment unit’s HPI growth rate from the control unit’s HPI growth rate at each event dates, 
which are lined up as different states adopted the law at different dates. The control units are 
obtained by matching on the estimated propensity scores
30
. We apply the restriction of obtaining 
matches within one year of the event date. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as the 
sample average cumulative abnormal return for quarter -16 to the specified quarter.  
 
2.3 A Model of Law Adoption 
In many studies of analysis of statutes, the statute is generally assumed exogenous. However, one 
might argue that many different legal, economic as well as special interest group activities 
gradually give rise to a situation when government enacts a law after much deliberation on the 
subject. Following Kiefer (1988), and de Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh (2004) we formulate a 
proportional hazard model in discrete time framework to ascertain what factors are instrumental 
in adopting a property condition disclosure law.   
 
)exp()()( 0 βλλ xtt ′=                                                                                                                 (13) 
In the model in equation (13), first part is a function of duration time, called the baseline hazard, 
and the second part is a function of explanatory variables other than time. The time is separated 
from the explanatory variables so that the hazard is obtained by shifting the baseline hazard as the 
explanatory variables change (i.e. for all the cross section units the hazard is proportional to the 
baseline hazard function). One popular form of the model is the logit estimation where each unit 
contributes several terms to a logit likelihood function, one term for each period for which the 
                                                 
30
 See Appendix A for detail exposition on the event study procedure employed in this paper. 
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unit was at risk of leaving the treatment stage
31
. The baseline hazard can be specified by allowing 
the intercept to be different for logit formulations of each time-period (i.e. by including a dummy 
variable for each representative period) or by including a function of time. We assume that once a 
law is adopted, it will remain; and eliminate the observations after the disclosure law has been 
adopted. This censoring of the data is reasonable given that no state has ever repealed property 
condition disclosure law. The hazard function can be represented by a standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. Therefore, we could estimate the model after conditioning on 
the event not yet having occurred using a standard logit specification.  
 
3 Data Description  
The study uses information on economic variables and institutional variables for 291 MSAs in 50 
US States from 1984 to 2004. For MSA level analysis, we utilize the quarterly information i.e. 
24,444 observations. The state level analysis is based on yearly information i.e. 1,050 
observations. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has changed the definition of MSAs a 
few times during the study period. Since, OFHEO uses 2003 MSA definition to compute the 
housing price index; we use 2003 MSA definition for our analysis. Since, our treatment variable 
is the adoption of disclosure law, which is state-mandated, we discard the MSAs, which cross the 
state boundaries, and we discard the consolidated MSAs.  
 
To our knowledge, 36 states have already mandated some form of disclosure statement. We 
obtained the effective dates of the mandate from official statements for different states
32
. To 
estimate the housing price changes, we use the repeat sales quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI), 
reported by the OFHEO. We use quarterly percentage change in HPI in MSA level analysis. For 
yearly analysis, we take the average quarterly rate of change for the year. This is the case with the 
                                                 
31
 See Kennedy (1998), pg. 259-261 for a simple discussion on this structure. 
32
 Pancak et al. (1996) lists the states, which adopted the disclosure law until 1996. 
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propensity score matching analyses. One important advantage of the time period is that on 
average, we can observe the treated units sufficiently before and after the adoption of the 
disclosure law for most of the states. In our sample, California, being the first state, adopted the 
law in 1987, while the majority of other 35 states adopted the law in 1990s. 
 
3.1 Economic Variables: 
      We use labor market characteristics like the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate and the 
job growth rate, which are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In order to comply 
with 2003 MSA definition, we use county labor market information to aggregate up to the MSA 
level. Other economic variables include percentage change in per capita income, percentage 
change in per capita Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) and Gross State Product (GSP), single-
family 30-year average mortgage rate for states, and population growth rate. Broadly these 
variables characterize the economic make-up of the state or the MSA. Data on these controls are 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) except for GMP. GMP data is not 
publicly available. We compute MSA share of GSP to use it as a proxy for GMP
33
. United States 
Conference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties publish GMP data from 1997. 
Comparing with the United States Conference of Mayors and the National Association of 
Counties’ GMP data, we find that our proxy is close to the official estimates. Moreover, we are 
interested in the variation in per capita GMP. Economic variables except labor market controls 
are available on a yearly basis. We interpolate these variables to the quarterly level
34
.  
 
 
                                                 
33
 Proxy GMP=GSP*(MSA population/State population). 
34
 Since linear interpolation takes two yearly values and fits a straight line while projecting the 
data in between, it is generally less accurate than other polynomial based methods. So, we apply a 
cubic spline interpolation method, which uses the data point value along with the first and the 
second derivatives at each surrounding point to interpolate. When we compare the results with 
interpolated quarterly data with the actual yearly data, the qualitative results do not differ.  
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3.2 Institutional Variables: 
      Numerous lawsuits against the real estate licensees made the case for adoption of disclosure 
laws. Potentially the legal activities are governed by the institutional characteristics of the state. 
Statistics from the Digest of Real Estate Licensing Laws and Current Issues (reports from 1985 to 
2005) compiled by the Association of Real Estate Licensing Law Officials (ARELLO) provide a 
rich set of characteristics that are closely associated with the institutional backdrop of the 
disclosure law. For example, the number of complaints against real estate licensees indicates the 
broad dissatisfaction about the licensee service. Similarly, the number of disciplinary actions 
taken against the licensees provides information about how the monitoring authority performs its 
duty
35
. Other institutional controls include number of active brokers, associate brokers, and 
salespersons in each state and the broker supervision. It was the concerted movement and 
lobbying on the part of realtor’s association, which brought the law in most states. To have a 
sense of how organized the real estate agents are in different states, we include the number of 
active brokers, associate brokers, and salespersons in each state in our analysis. Ideally, the 
percentage of licensees who are associated with some trade organizations like NAR could serve 
as an excellent indicator of the lobbying effort. However, it is hard to obtain this information 
across the states for a long time series that we are considering in this study. We also include a 
measure of the extent of broker supervision in our analysis. Pancak and Sirmans (2005) expect 
that “greater supervision would prevent intentional and unintentional wrong doing on the part of 
salespersons, and therefore decrease findings of misconduct”. These variables broadly 
characterize the institutional make-up of the real estate market. We also include a control for 
                                                 
35
 When disciplinary actions figure is missing or zero, we take the average of the figures within 1-
year range. When total disciplinary actions figure is missing in ARELLO reports, if available, we 
take the sum of the figures under different categories of disciplinary actions, or, we take the sum 
of the actions by consent and number of formal hearing as total number of disciplinary actions 
(this is the case until 1986). Then we take sum of disciplinary action and formal hearing from 
column of complaints resulting in some actions. Both of these are expected to provide the number 
of complaints having enough substance to attract legal attention. This is typically the case with 
Arizona and Hawaii for 1984 to 1986. 
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partisan control in the state legislation. Following de Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh (2004), we 
include an indicator variable for democratic and republican control. In order to fully exploit the 
information on political make-up of the state general assembly, we use detail partisan control 
variables rather than a simple blue/red category. Above all else, the political process decides on 
enacting a regulation. We use democratic control with republican governor as the omitted 
category. The information on partisan control for each general election cycle is obtained from 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). 
 
Table (1) reports the summary statistics of the above controls for the treated and the control units. 
Few important observations can be made from the summary statistics of the two groups. Both at 
the MSA level as well as the state level, average percentage change in HPI is slightly higher (1.13 
percent against 1.01 percent for MSAs, and 1.24 percent against 1 percent for States) for the 
treated group than for the control group. Unemployment rate and other economic controls are 
generally, on average, higher for the control units. Remarkably, average number of disciplinary 
actions (about 110 against 43) and average number of complaints (about 869 against 793) are 
higher for the states, which adopted disclosure law. Generally, a higher number of disciplinary 
actions and complaints against the licensees suggest that these controls are important in capturing 
the dissatisfaction of the consumers, and also due to high volume of complaints, regulators might 
be inclined to a state-mandated disclosure requirement. On average, control units tend to have 
greater broker supervision (50 percent against 48 percent) than the treated units. This supports the 
hypothesis that greater broker supervision ensures less mistakes and greater awareness of the 
market practices among salespersons, which, in turn, tend to reduce the dissatisfaction among the 
homeowners. The disclosure states tend to have higher number of active licensees. Interestingly, 
the treated states are more likely to be under republican control than under democratic control.  
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4 Empirical Results 
We discussed the slow adjustment process of the legal shock in the methodology section. To get a 
sense of how ‘slow’ is the adjustment process we use equation (4) i.e. the regression model that 
allows for MSA and time effects, and specify the length of legal dummy to be single quarter, four 
quarters, eight quarters and, up to thirty-six quarters or nine years. Since different states adopted 
the law in different times, there are a different number of states with disclosure law associated 
with different lengths of adjustment. Therefore, we try two ways to test the robustness of the 
outcome. First, we keep the sample size same for all the lengths. Next, we adjust the sample size 
as we increase the length. In Figure (2), we plot the estimates on legal dummy variable from 
different specifications in terms of lengths of law adjustment.  
 
 
Figure 2  Plot of the Estimates 
 
The analysis reveals significant effects when we assume long-term persistence in the shock. The 
effect is most pronounced in 4 to 6 years of windows. This is quite consistent with the theoretical 
hypothesis in Figure (1). Figure (2) also reveals that the estimate is almost zero when we specify 
the length as 8 to 9 years. However, to get the actual effect size, we need to multiply the estimates 
with the corresponding number of quarters that we specify as the lengths of adjustment.  
0 
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Figure 3  Plot of the Actual Effect Sizes 
 
For example, in figure (2), the effect is about 0.182 per quarter for the model with 4 years (or 16 
quarters) of length of persistence where we use the adjusted sample. Therefore the actual effect is 
2.91 (= 0.182*16). We plot the actual effect size in figure (3). Figure (3) reveals that the effect 
size decreases gradually and is not zero in 8 to 9 years of adjustment lengths. It suggests that the 
effect of the law on property values is generally spread over about four to six years. Therefore, 
we argue for treating adoption of the law as a shock to the housing market that stays for four 
years on average, and take it forward for rest of the analyses. 
 
4.1 Parametric Results 
Results for equations (1) through (5) are reported in Table (2) for MSA level analysis. Table (2) 
reports the simple panel data estimation results. Column (1) reports the OLS estimates while 
Columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) report the estimates after controlling for the time fixed effect, both 
time and state fixed effects, both time and MSA fixed effects, and first-differenced model 
respectively. After allowing for MSA effects, coefficient on the indicator variable for adoption of 
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law suggests a positive effect (ranging from 1.7 to 4.6 percent on the HPI growth rate) on 
property values.  
 
In figure (2), the effect is about 0.182 per quarter for the model with 4 years (or 16 quarters) of 
length of persistence, where we use the adjusted sample. Therefore the actual effect is 2.91 (= 
0.182*16). We plot the actual effect size in figure (3). In table (2) column (4), we find the same 
effect as we use the 4 year time period for effect of the law. 
 
Comparing across the columns (3), (4), and (5) reveals positive impact of the disclosure law on 
house prices. As expected, compared to the mean-differencing approach, first-differencing reports 
substantially lower adjusted R-squared. The joint significance tests for time and cross-section 
effects suggest the importance of controlling for these effects. The estimates on economic and 
institutional variables are moderately robust across the specifications except in the first-
differencing method. Complete democratic control seems to have positive effect on the property 
values. The main finding from Table (2) is the positive impact of adopting the disclosure law on 
property values at the MSA level.  
 
Results from feasible GLS procedure are reported in Table (3). As discussed in Section 2, feasible 
GLS procedure provides improvement (in terms of efficiency gain) over pooled regressions in 
Table (2) when we specify the error structure. Table (3) reveals robust positive impact of 
adoption of law on house prices. The overall magnitude of the estimates (effect size ranging from 
2.6 to 4 percent) is similar to the effect size in Table (2). The rationale behind explicit 
assumptions about serial correlation is established in Table (3). 
 
Table (4) reports the dynamic panel estimation results. Results for four different structural 
equations are reported. The first model uses third through seventh lagged dependent variables as 
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instruments for first lagged HPI. Column (2) reports the structural model with estimates using 
fifth through ninth lagged dependent variables as instruments for first lagged HPI. Columns (3) 
and (4) report the similar structural models but with the further lags (seventh through eleventh 
and ninth through thirteenth) as instruments. We estimated all the models including lagged labor 
force variables and find that they do not affect the quantitative and qualitative results. Therefore, 
we report the results without the lagged labor force variables.   
 
For the instrumental variable approach of Table (4) to eliminate the bias from an endogenous 
dependent variable, we need to choose proper instruments. By construction, there are correlations 
between the dependent variable, and first as well as second order lagged dependent variables in 
the reduced form equation. However, there may still be correlation between the dependent 
variable and third (or higher) order lagged dependent variable due to possible persistence in the 
house price generating process. Therefore, we use only longer lags to provide consistent estimates 
in the presence of persistence in the data. Due to better large sample properties, we use Schwartz 
Bayesian Criterion (SC) to choose the optimal number of lags. SC suggests using five lags in the 
reduced form equations. The broad qualitative results still hold in the dynamic framework. Our 
variable of interest – adoption of law – is positive, although not statistically significant, across 
different sets of instruments, and the effect size is smaller than the range of magnitude that we 
find in Tables (2) and (3). Except for column (2), the over-identification tests reject the validity of 
the instruments. Therefore, we avoid inferring the results from this analysis. Probably, a better 
model specification may bring about the effect and significance that is similar to the estimates in 
Tables (2) and (3.3). 
 
4.2 Semi-Parametric Results 
Table (5) reveals the results from semi-parametric propensity score matching analysis. It presents 
three different estimation strategies with three different estimators for the outcome variable for 
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one model specification (as in Table (5) column (4)) for estimating the propensity scores. This 
analysis is done with yearly data at the MSA level– i.e. information about 291 MSAs for 21 
years
36
. As discussed in Section (2), each of these estimation strategies provides some 
quantitative and qualitative gains over each other. We try to see the robustness of the effects 
across these methods. For each of the methods, we look at the effects with three different 
estimators: first, a simple average difference in percentage change in HPI that does not control for 
cross-section and time effects; second, an average difference in percentage change in HPI after 
controlling for the year effect; and third, we pull out the cross-section effect by subtracting the 
percentage change in HPI from a benchmark year from the second estimator. In general, table (6) 
reveals strongly positive and fairly robust impact of property condition disclosure law on house 
prices across different methods, and model assumptions. As we discussed before, Kernel 
matching estimator provides some useful advantages over other two methods. Column (3) from 
Kernel matching method reveals about 0.21 per quarter or 3.36 percent (which is, 0.21*16= 3.36, 
for 16 quarters) significant and positive effect on the HPI growth rate.  
 
Table (6) reports the results from an event study analysis at the MSA level. We calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns for 33 quarters i.e. 16 quarters before and after the event date. The 
analysis suggests about 2.6 percent increase in house prices due to adoption of the property 
condition disclosure law. On average, the event date abnormal return is positive. Almost 50 
percent of the abnormal return estimates are positive on the event date and on other dates in the 
event window. The percentage of positive abnormal returns is slightly higher in the post-event 
time periods than in the pre-event dates. The plot of CARs in Figure (4) reveals that the effect of 
                                                 
36
 While conducting the yearly analysis, we test alternative specifications for the timing of the law 
adoption. Since we know the effective day of the mandate, we could assign the corresponding 
year as the adoption year. However, one could argue that if the effective date falls in last two 
quarters of the year, bulk of home sales has already taken place. So, the effectiveness of the 
mandate really starts from next year. We tried both the specifications. The qualitative and 
quantitative results are robust to this concern. 
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the law increases gradually in the event window and supports the hypothesis that the initial 
skepticism about the effectiveness of the law gradually goes away and the buyers offer higher bid 
prices for the houses disclosed to be in good condition. 
 
4.3 Robustness and Comparisons 
The important finding of robust positive impact of the law on house prices in Tables (5) and (6) 
warrants comparison with the parametric results. Comparing with columns (2) and (3) in Table 
(2) and columns (3) and (6) in Table (3), the effect size is larger from the semi-parametric 
analysis (about 3.3 percent compared to 2.7-2.9 percent). We get about 2.6 percent effect size 
from the event study analysis. A pertinent question is which approach we should prefer. As 
pointed out in Slottje et al. (2005), matching estimators come with a few advantages. First, there 
are fewer assumptions about the distribution of the data. Second, it allows for non-parametric 
interactions among all the covariates in determining the outcome (i.e. selection on observables). 
Third, it compares within a group of ‘very similar’ units. Parametric approaches consider all the 
units to infer on the effect. This is also true for the event study approach. Moreover, the event 
study approach allows us to focus on the event date effect. The usual critique of the matching 
estimation technique regarding smaller sample sizes is not pronounced in the current context as 
we have many observations for both the treated and the control units. This suggests that we 
should prefer the semi-parametric estimators for the purpose of inference. 
 
4.4 Factors Explaining Law Adoption 
Table (7) reports results from four different model specifications for the proportional hazard 
model of disclosure law adoption. This table is identical to Table (2), which is our baseline 
framework in Chapter (2). The analysis is done with the state-level data (1,050 observations). We 
use the pre-disclosure average number of disciplinary actions taken against the licensees, licensee 
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supervision index, and number of licensees as controls for pre-treatment characteristics
37
. 
Essentially, we assume that these institutional characteristics are exclusive to the housing market. 
We still use the economic variables as time-varying attributes since they are not directly 
associated with the institutional environment of the housing market. The columns are 
distinguished by the inclusion of lagged percentage change in HPI. It seems that inclusion of the 
second lagged percentage change in HPI matters in this set-up. We also allow the intercepts to 
differ across the census divisions. Most importantly, as hypothesized, average number of 
disciplinary actions seems to determine whether the state would adopt the law. Greater number of 
disciplinary actions conveys a signal in favor of a state mandate (robust significant positive 
impact across the columns). The greater the degree of broker supervision, the lower is the state’s 
likelihood of adopting the law (robust significant negative impact across the columns). This is in 
line with the postulate that greater broker supervision, by ensuring less mistakes and greater 
awareness of the market practices among salespersons, tends to reduce dissatisfaction among the 
homeowners, which, in turn, lowers the number of lawsuits that signals the movement towards 
adopting the law. Interestingly, as observed in Table (1), republican control tends to favor 
(although not statistically significant) the adoption of property condition disclosure law, that 
promote transparency in housing transactions. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The study examines the impacts of seller's property condition disclosure mandate on the 
residential real estate values. We analyze the effect of information transparency and the shift of 
risk from buyers and brokers to the sellers due to adoption of the law on property values. The 
analytical structure employs parametric dynamic panel data models, semi-parametric propensity 
score matching models, and an event study framework using a rich set of economic and 
                                                 
37
 Due to missing information, we use earliest available data for Indiana, Montana, and New 
York. However, we still use information from pre-disclosure period of these states. 
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institutional variables for a quarterly panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 
a yearly panel of 50 US States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004 to address the research 
question.  
 
Analyzing the MSA level variation in Housing Price Indices, we find positive effect (about three 
to four percent) of the seller’s property condition disclosure law on property values, and the effect 
is spread over about four years. We suggest using semi-parametric approaches due to absence of 
any a priori distributional assumption, and comparison based on similar units. The results suggest 
that the average seller may be able to fetch a higher price for the house if she furnishes a state-
mandated seller’s property condition disclosure statement to the buyer. The state-mandated 
disclosure requirement ensures widespread compliance. The plausible reasons behind this 
premium could be the buyer’s greater confidence in the quality of the house she is acquiring, and 
the higher quality of the houses up for sale. The Property Condition Disclosure Law brings about 
the much-desired transparency in housing transactions, which increases the prospective 
homeowners’ confidence. The finding is consistent with the generally held postulate by real estate 
agents and scholars about the favorable impact of the law on average house prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  30 
References 
 
Ahn, S.C., and P. Schmidt, (1995), “Efficient Estimation of Models for Dynamic Panel Data”, 
Journal of Econometrics, 68, 5-27. 
 
Arellano, M., and B. Honore, (2001), “Panel Data Models: Some Recent Developments” in J. 
Heckman and E. Leamer edited Handbook of Econometrics, Vol 5, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Arellano, M., and S. Bond, (1991), “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies 58: 277-297. 
 
Association of Real Estate Licensing Law Officials (ARELLO), (1985-2005), Digest of Real 
Estate Licensing Laws and Current Issues. 
 
Becker, S.O., and A. Ichino, (2002), “Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Based on 
Propensity Scores”, The Stata Journal, Vol.2, No.4, pp. 358-377. 
 
Bertrand, M., E. Duflow, and S. Mullainathan, (2002) “How much should we trust Differences-
in-Differences estimates?” NBER Working paper No. 8841. 
 
Bhagat, S., and R. Romano, (2001), “Event Studies and the Law - Part I: Technique and 
Corporate Litigation”, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and 
Public Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 259. 
 
Bhagat, S., and R. Romano, (2001), “Event Studies and the Law - Part II: Empirical Studies and 
Corporate Law”, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and 
Public Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 260. 
 
Caliendo, M., and S. Kopeinig, (2005), “Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of 
Propensity Score Matching”, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 1588. 
 
Campbell J. Y., A. W. Lo, and A. C. McKinley (1997), “The Econometrics of Financial 
Markets”, Chapter 4 on Event Study Analysis, pg. 149-180, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey. 
  31 
 
de Figueiredo Jr., Rui J.P., and R.G. Vanden Bergh, (2004), “The Political Economy of State-
Level Administrative Procedure Acts”, The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XLVII. 
 
Dehejia, R.H., and S. Wahba, (1999), “Causal Effects in Nonexperimental Studies: Reevaluating 
the Evaluation of Training Programs”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 94, 
No. 448, 1053-1062. 
 
Dehejia, R.H., and S. Wahba, (2002). “Propensity Score Matching for Nonexperimental Causal 
Studies”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 151-161. 
 
Enders, W., (2003), “Applied Econometric Time Series”, Second Edition, Wiley Series in 
Probability and Statistics. 
 
Greene, W., (2003), “Econometric Analysis”, Fifth Edition, Pearson, India. 
  
Heckman, J.J., H. Ichimura, and P.E. Todd, (1997). “Matching as an Econometric Evaluation 
Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program”. Review of Economic Studies 64, 
605-654. 
 
Heckman, J.J., H. Ichimura, and P.E. Todd, (1998). “Matching as an econometric evaluation 
estimator.” Review of Economic Studies 65, 261-294. 
 
Kennedy, P., (1998), “A Guide to Econometrics”, Fourth Edition, MIT Press. 
 
Kezdi, G., (2003). “Robust Standard Error Estimation in Fixed-Effects Panel Models,” SSRN 
Working Paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=596988). 
 
Kiefer, N.M., (1988), “Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 26, No. 2, 646-769. 
 
Lefcoe, G., (2004), “Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How Realtors Eased the Transition 
from ‘Caveat Emptor’ to ‘Seller Tell All’ ”, Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal, Summer. 
 
  32 
Miller, N.G., and L. Peng, (2005), “Exploring Metropolitan Housing Price Volatility”, Journal 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, Forthcoming. 
 
Moore, G.S., and G. Smolen, (2000), “Real Estate Disclosure Forms and Information Transfer”, 
Real Estate Law Journal, 28: 319-326. 
 
Olazabal, A.M., (2003), “Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of 
State Regulatory Responses”, Harvard Journal on Legislation, 40: 65-132. 
 
Pancak, K.A., and C. F. Sirmans, (2005), “The Effect of Agency Reform on Real Estate Service 
Quality”, University of Connecticut Working Paper. 
 
Pancak, K.A., T.J. Miceli, and C. F. Sirmans, (1996), “Residential Disclosure Laws: The Further 
Demise of Caveat Emptor”, Real Estate Law Journal, 24: 291-332. 
 
Rosenbaum, P.R., and D.B. Rubin, (1983), “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects”, Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55. 
 
Slottje, D.J, D.L. Millimet, and M.J. Buchanan, (2005), “Econometric Analysis of Copyrights”, 
Journal of Econometrics, Forthcoming, http://faculty.smu.edu/millimet/pdf/copyrights.pdf. 
 
Smith, J., and P.E. Todd., (2003), “Does Matching Address Lalonde’s Critique of 
Nonexperimental Estimators”. Journal of Econometrics, Forthcoming, 
http://athena.sas.upenn.edu/~petra/papers/nsw.pdf. 
 
Todd, P.E., (1999), “A Practical Guide to Implementing Matching Estimators”, Unpublished 
Manuscript, http://athena.sas.upenn.edu/~petra/papers/prac.pdf. 
 
Woolridge, J., (2002), “Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data”, MIT Press. 
 
Zumpano, L.V., and K.H. Johnson, (2003), “Real Estate Broker Liability and Property Condition 
Disclosure”, Real Estate Law Journal, 31, 285-302. 
 
 
 
  33 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
Disclosure Mandate 
 
No Disclosure Mandate 
 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
                 291 Metropolitan Statistical Areas Characteristics: 1984Q1—2004Q4:  24,444 
Observations 
%Change in HPI
38
 
 
17,189 
 
 
1.127 
 
 
2.186 
 
 
4,615 
 
 
1.012 
 
 
2.046 
 
 
%Unemployment Rate 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
8.660 
 
 
9.227 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
10.254 
 
 
15.976 
 
 
%Job Growth Rate 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
0.443 
 
 
4.081 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
0.556 
 
 
2.352 
 
 
%Per Capita Income Change 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
5.619 
 
 
3.103 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
6.207 
 
 
2.943 
 
 
%Per Capita GMP Growth 
Rate 
 
19,068 
 
 
1.142 
 
 
0.741 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
1.128 
 
 
0.657 
 
 
%Population Growth Rate 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
0.292 
 
 
0.387 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
0.373 
 
 
0.412 
 
 
50   States Characteristics: 1984—2004: 1,050 Observations 
 
%Change in HPI 
 
735 
 
 
1.243 
 
 
1.329 
 
 
315 
 
 
1.008 
 
 
0.789 
 
 %Unemployment Rate 
 
735 
 
 
5.514 
 
 
1.685 
 
 
315 
 
5.628 
 
 
1.879 
 
 %Job Growth Rate 
 
735 
 
 
1.513 
 
 
1.895 
 
 
315 1.682 
 
 
1.976 
 
 %Per Capita Income Change 
 
735 
 
 
1.392 
 
 
0.647 
 
 
315 1.417 
 
 
0.777 
 
 %Per Capita GSP Growth Rate 
 
735 
 
 
4.884 
 
 
3.432 
 
 
315 
 
 
4.707 
 
 
3.147 
 
 %Population Growth Rate 
 
735 
 
 
1.042 
 
 
1.084 
 
 
315 1.012 
 
 
1.210 
 
 %Mortgage Rate 
 
735 
 
 
8.432 
 
 
1.788 
 
 
315 8.433 
 
 
1.763 
 
 Number of Real Estate  
Licensees/1000 population 
735 
 
 
6.479 
 
 
3.735 
 
 
315 5.199 
 
 
2.430 
 
 No. of Complaints 
 
735 
 
 
868.650 
 
 
1482.715 
 
 
315 793.365 
 
 
2671.183 
 
 No. of Disciplinary Actions  
 
735 
 
 
109.686 
 
 
261.837 
 
 
315 42.768 
 
 
53.779 
 
 Licensee  
Supervision Index 
735 
 
 
47.785 
 
 
26.494 
 
 
315 50.191 
 
 
24.878 
 
 Democratic Control 
Democratic Governor 
735 
 
 
0.214 
 
 
0.410 
 
 
315 0.270 
 
 
0.444 
 
 Democratic Control 
Republican Governor 
735 
 
 
0.223 
 
 
0.417 
 
 
315 0.209 
 
 
0.407 
 
 Republican Control 
Republican Governor 
735 
 
 
0.284 
 
 
0.451 
 
 
315 0.269 
 
 
0.444 
 
 Republican Control 
Democratic Governor 
735 
 
 
0.246 
 
 
0.431 
 
 
315 0.238 
 
 
0.426 
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 The number of observations differs for HPI due to missing information for some MSAs in early 
years. 
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                                   Table 2 Parametric: OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis: MSA 
(Dependent Variable: Percent Change in HPI from previous quarter) 
Regressors 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
Law Adoption 
 
 
0.107** 
(0.054) 
 
0.288* 
(0.057) 
 
0.210* 
(0.058) 
 
0.182* 
(0.055) 
 
0.144 
(0.109) 
 
Mortgage Rate 
 
 
-0.130* 
(0.016) 
 
0.353* 
(0.115) 
 
0.768* 
(0.133) 
 
0.771* 
(0.134) 
 
0.709** 
(0.346) 
 
%Unemployment 
 
 
-0.006* 
(0.002) 
 
-0.009* 
(0.003) 
 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
 
%Job Growth 
 
 
0.004 
(0.006) 
 
0.003 
(0.006) 
 
0.004 
(0.006) 
 
0.003 
(0.006) 
 
0.002 
(0.004) 
 
%Per Capita Income 
Change 
 
0.062* 
(0.008) 
 
0.072* 
(0.011) 
 
0.076* 
(0.011) 
 
0.078* 
(0.011) 
 
0.026 
(0.017) 
 
%Per Capita GMP Growth 
Rate 
 
0.104* 
(0.038) 
 
0.115* 
(0.039) 
 
0.081** 
(0.040) 
 
0.079** 
(0.039) 
 
-0.094** 
(0.039) 
 
%Population Growth Rate 
 
 
0.573* 
(0.085) 
 
0.624* 
(0.096) 
 
0.798* 
(0.093) 
 
1.369* 
(0.114) 
 
0.835* 
(0.303) 
 
Democratic Control 
Democratic Governor 
 
-0.016 
(0.062) 
 
0.050 
(0.064) 
 
0.230* 
(0.071) 
 
0.210* 
(0.070) 
 
-0.305 
(0.176) 
 
Republican Control 
Republican Governor 
 
-0.075 
(0.062) 
 
-0.034 
(0.055) 
 
0.077 
(0.063) 
 
0.094 
(0.061) 
 
0.044 
(0.184) 
 
Democratic Control 
Republican Governor 
 
-0.184* 
(0.056) 
 
-0.081 
(0.052) 
 
-0.003 
(0.074) 
 
-0.012 
(0.073) 
 
-0.201 
(0.217) 
 
Number of Real Estate  
Licensees/1000 population 
 
0.007 
(0.007) 
 
0.011 
(0.008) 
 
-0.042** 
(0.016) 
 
-0.044** 
(0.017) 
 
0.064*** 
(0.033) 
 
% Disciplinary Action taken 
/ number of complaints 
 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 
Licensee  
Supervision Index 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.008* 
(0.001) 
 
-0.011* 
(0.003) 
 
-0.011* 
(0.002) 
 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
 
 Fixed Effects? 
 
 
 
None 
 
 
 
Time 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Time 
State 
Mean Difference 
 
Time 
MSA 
Mean 
Difference 
Time 
MSA 
First Difference 
 
Joint Significance 
of Time Effects 
  
F (83, 290) =35.48 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 
F (83, 290) = 34.34 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 
F (83, 290) = 
33.68 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 
F (82, 290) = 32.79 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 
Joint Significance 
of Cross-Section Effects 
 
  
F (48, 290) = 21.58 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 
F (60, 290) 
=1.2e+05 
(Pr= 0.00)  
Adj. R
2 
 
0.035 
 
0.109 
 
0.129 
 
0.144 
 
0.002 
 
N 
 
19,577 
 
19,577 
 
19,577 
 
19,577 
 
19,067 
 
NOTES:  Clustered (on MSAs) standard errors are reported within parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ imply 
1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level. We include the state-level institutional controls in 
these regressions due to the possibility that although they are not directly associated with the house prices, 
they may be correlated with the unobservables directly associated with the house prices. Including fixed 
effects may not be able to fully mitigate the bias. 
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Table 3 Parametric: Feasible GLS Procedure: MSA 
(Dependent Variable: Percent Change in HPI from previous quarter) 
Regressors 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
Law Adoption 
 
 
0.265* 
(0.034) 
 
0.251* 
(0.031) 
 
0.165* 
(0.030) 
 
0.207*** 
(0.115) 
 
0.191** 
(0.081) 
 
0.168** 
(0.080) 
 
Fixed Effects? 
 
 
 
Time 
 
 
 
Time 
 
 
 
Time 
 
 
 
Time, 
MSA 
First Difference 
 
 
Time, 
MSA 
First Difference 
 
Time, 
MSA 
First Difference 
 
Panel 
Heteroscedasticity? 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Error Structure? 
 
 
No AR 
 
 
 
Same 
AR(1) 
Across Panels 
 
Panel Specific 
AR(1) 
 
 
No AR 
 
 
 
Same 
AR(1) 
Across Panels 
 
Panel Specific 
AR(1) 
 
 
N 19,577 19,577 19,576 19,067 19,067 19,066 
NOTES: All the specifications include the all the regressors reported in Table 2. Only the coefficient of 
law adoption dummy variable is reported here. We employ iterative feasible Generalized Least Squares 
procedure. We test the hypothesis that the error term may follow different auto-regressive processes 
across MSAs and for each MSA. Robust Standard errors are reported within parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and 
‘***’ imply 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level. 
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Table 4 Parametric: Dynamic Panel Estimation: MSA 
(Dependent Variable: Percent Change in HPI from previous quarter) 
Regressors 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
Law Adoption 
 
 
0.125 
(0.108) 
 
0.062 
(0.111) 
 
0.102 
(0.117) 
 
0.074 
(0.114) 
 
HPI-rate_Lag1 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.065) 
 
0.264 
(0.441) 
 
-0.203 
(0.278) 
 
 
-0.546 
(0.396) 
 
Fixed Effects? 
 
 
 
Time, 
MSA, 
First Difference 
 
Time, 
MSA, 
First Difference 
 
Time, 
MSA, 
First Difference 
 
Time, 
MSA, 
First Difference 
 
Over-Identification 
Test 
 
χ2(4)=150.097 
(Pr~0.00) 
 
χ2(4)=2.275 
(Pr~0.70) 
 
χ2(4)=6.442 
(Pr~0.11) 
 
χ2(4)=4.592 
(Pr~0.32) 
 
Adj. R
2 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
N 
 
17,096 
 
16,568 16,049 15,527 
NOTES:  All the specifications include the all the regressors reported in Table 2. Only the coefficients 
of law adoption dummy variable and HPI lags are reported here. Clustered Standard errors are reported 
within parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ imply 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level. 
Labor force variables include unemployment rate and job growth rate. Lagged labor force variables do 
not seem to matter, so we do not include them in these models. Column (1) contains HPI-rate_Lags 3-7. 
Column (2) contains HPI-rate_Lags 5-9. Column (3) contains HPI-rate_Lags 7-11. Column (4) contains 
HPI-rate_Lags 9-13. F-tests reject the null hypotheses of equal intercept across time and cross-sections 
for all the models. The over-identifying restrictions for validity of instruments are not rejected for the 
model in column (2). See Wooldridge (2002), pg. 123-124 for a discussion on heteroscedasticity-robust 
version of the over-identification test. 
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Table 5 Semi-Parametric: Average Treatment Effect: Propensity Score Matching Estimation: MSA 
Stratification Estimators 
 
Nearest Neighbor Estimators 
 
Kernel Matching Estimators 
 
(1) 
Average 
Difference 
 
 
 
(2) 
Average 
Difference 
Year FE 
 
 
(3) 
DID- 
Benchmark 
 
 
 
(1) 
Average Difference 
 
 
 
(2) 
Average Difference 
Year FE 
 
 
(3) 
DID- 
Benchmark 
 
 
 
(1) 
Average Difference 
 
 
 
(2) 
Average Difference 
Year FE 
 
 
(3) 
DID- 
Benchmark 
 
 
 
0.055 
(0.044) 
 
 
0.158* 
(0.047) 
 
 
0.166 
(0.117) 
 
 
0.069 
(0.070) 
 
 
0.173* 
(0.069) 
 
 
0.195 
(0.171) 
 
 
0.099* 
(0.038) 
 
 
0.206* 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.219* 
(0.079) 
 
 
 
NOTES: Treatment is the law adoption. Outcome is the percent change in average quarterly HPI from the previous year to current year. All the parametric 
models for estimating propensity scores include the controls as in Table (7) column (4). Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, 
and ‘***’ imply 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level. Estimator- (1) is defined as Difference in Average HPI rate between treated and 
control groups. Estimator- (2) is obtained from estimator- (1) after controlling for the year effect. Estimator- (3) is defined as Difference-in-Difference in 
Average HPI rate after controlling for year effect between treated and control groups, relative to a HPI rate from a year before the disclosure law adoption 
as benchmark. Since there are some MSAs, which have missing HPI rate in early years of the sample period, we use earliest available HPI rate as the 
benchmark. However, we make sure that the benchmark is from a year prior to adoption of the disclosure law. This leaves us with 286 MSAs for the 
analysis. For Stratification estimators, we first estimate a probit model to obtain the cumulative probability of adopting disclosure law. The predicted 
cumulative probability from the probit model is the propensity score. Then, we split the sample into five (or more) equally spaced intervals (or bins) of the 
propensity score. Within each bin, we test that the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ. If it differs, we split the interval more 
until the condition is satisfied. Next step is to test that the average characteristics do not differ between treated and control group in each bin. This implies 
that the balancing property is satisfied. The balancing property could not be satisfied with MSA level data for few bins. We discard those unbalanced bins. 
This is similar to discarding the bins where we do not find either any treated or control units. Discarding these bins does not affect the results. The Nearest 
Neighbor estimators take each treated unit and find the control unit, which is closest in terms of magnitude of the propensity score. Therefore, by 
construction, each treated unit should have matches, which enables us to avoid the pitfall of discarding some bins in stratification method. However, some 
matches would be poor in quality. The Kernel Matching estimators get all treated units matched with a weighted average of all control units, where 
weights are computed as inverse of the Euclidean distance between the propensity scores of the two groups. Therefore, it tackles the problem of poor 
matches from the nearest neighbor method.  
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Table 6 An Event Study of the Adoption of Disclosure Law: MSA 
Event Date/ 
Quarter 
 
Abnormal 
Return (AR) 
 
Positive ARs 
% 
 
33-Quarter 
CAR 
 
25-Quarter 
CAR 
 
17-Quarter 
CAR 
 
9-Quarter 
CAR 
 -16 
 
0.606* 
(0.251) 
 
52 
 
0.606 
    
-15 
 
-0.111 
(0.309) 
 
44 
 
0.495 
    
-14 
 
0.047 
(0.285) 
 
54 
 
0.542 
    
-13 
 
0.525** 
(0.273) 
 
52 
 
1.067 
    
-12 
 
-0.046 
(0.250) 
 
42 
 
1.021 
 
-0.046 
   
-11 
 
0.090 
(0.199) 
 
51 
 
1.111 
 
0.044 
   
-10 
 
-0.049 
(0.201) 
 
50 
 
1.062 
 
-0.005 
   
-9 
 
0.182 
(0.178) 
 
52 
 
1.244 
 
0.177 
   
-8 
 
0.367*** 
(0.207) 
 
55 
 
1.611 
 
0.544 
 
0.367 
  
-7 
 
-0.255 
(0.165) 
 
43 
 
1.356 
 
0.289 
 
0.112 
  
-6 
 
0.095 
(0.167) 
 
51 
 
1.451 
 
0.384 
 
0.207 
  
-5 
 
-0.225 
(0.167) 
 
43 
 
1.226 
 
0.159 
 
-0.018 
  
-4 
 
-0.118 
(0.170) 
 
48 
 
1.108 
 
0.041 
 
-0.135 
 
-0.118 
 
-3 
 
0.255 
(0.163) 
 
52 
 
1.363 
 
0.296 
 
0.119 
 
0.137 
 
-2 
 
0.007 
(0.161) 
 
43 
 
1.370 
 
0.303 
 
0.126 
 
0.144 
 
-1 
 
-0.279 
(0.163) 
 
46 
 
1.090 
 
0.023 
 
-0.153 
 
-0.136 
 
0 
 
0.256** 
(0.141) 
 
50 
 
1.346 
 
0.279 
 
0.103 
 
0.120 
 
1 
 
0.053 
(0.126) 
 
46 
 
1.401 
 
0.333 
 
0.156 
 
0.174 
 
2 
 
-0.271 
(0.153) 
 
44 
 
1.128 
 
0.061 
 
-0.115 
 
-0.098 
 
3 
 
-0.101 
(0.178) 
 
46 
 
1.029 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.215 
 
-0.197 
 
4 
 
-0.140 
(0.178) 
 
44 
 
0.888 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.355 
 
-0.338 
 
5 
 
0.164 
(0.159) 
 
52 
 
1.052 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.192 
  
6 
 
-0.008 
(0.149) 
 
49 
 
1.044 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.199 
  
7 
 
0.390* 
(0.157) 
 
57 
 
1.434 
 
0.367 
 
0.191 
  
8 
 
0.111 
(0.131) 
 
50 
 
1.545 
 
0.478 
 
0.302 
  
9 
 
0.001 
(0.156) 
 
50 
 
1.545 
 
0.478 
   
10 
 
0.224*** 
(0.135) 
 
60 
 
1.769 
 
0.702 
   
11 
 
0.028 
(0.140) 
 
48 
 
1.797 
 
0.730 
   
12 
 
-0.044 
(0.127) 
 
49 
 
1.753 
 
0.686 
   
13 
 
0.240*** 
(0.141) 
 
50 
 
1.993 
 
 
   
14 
 
0.352* 
(0.119) 
 
55 
 
2.345 
    
15 
 
-0.132 
(0.126) 
 
47 
 
2.213 
    
16 
 
0.086 
(0.134) 
 
57 
 
2.299 
    
  39 
 
 
Figure 4  Plot of Cumulative Abnormal Return for Adoption of Disclosure Law 
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Table 7 Proportional Hazard Model of Law Adoption 
(Dependent Variable: Law Adoption Dummy) 
Regressors 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
Time-Invariant Avg. No. of 
Disciplinary Actions relative 
to avg. no. of complaints 
 
0.006 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.006 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.007*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.007*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
Time-Invariant Licensee  
Supervision Index 
 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.007*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.007*** 
(0.004) 
 
Time-Invariant Number of 
Real Estate Licensees/1000 
population 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
 
-0.024 
(0.028) 
 
-0.023 
(0.028) 
 
-0.025 
(0.028) 
 
Democratic Control 
Democratic Governor 
 
-0.124 
(0.269) 
 
-0.126 
(0.268) 
 
-0.093 
(0.269) 
 
-0.101 
(0.268) 
 
Republican Control 
Republican Governor 
 
0.011 
(0.226) 
 
0.009 
(0.227) 
 
0.058 
(0.233) 
 
0.058 
(0.233) 
 
Democratic Control 
Republican Governor 
 
0.071 
(0.295) 
 
0.071 
(0.294) 
 
0.107 
(0.295) 
 
0.105 
(0.295) 
 
Mortgage Rate 
 
 
-0.374* 
(0.140) 
 
-0.368** 
(0.145) 
 
-0.365** 
(0.148) 
 
-0.358** 
(0.147) 
 
% Unemployment 
 
 
-0.093 
(0.077) 
 
-0.115 
(0.077) 
 
-0.125 
(0.081) 
 
-0.135*** 
(0.080) 
 
% Job Growth 
 
 
0.173** 
(0.072) 
 
0.169** 
(0.071) 
 
0.171** 
(0.072) 
 
0.170** 
(0.072) 
 
%Per Capita Income Change 
 
 
-0.262*** 
(0.151) 
 
-0.246 
(0.153) 
 
-0.279*** 
(0.151) 
 
-0.266*** 
(0.151) 
 
%Per Capita GSP Growth 
Rate 
 
-0.031 
(0.027) 
 
-0.025 
(0.027) 
 
-0.020 
(0.028) 
 
-0.019 
(0.028) 
 
%Population Growth Rate 
 
 
0.091 
(0.109) 
 
0.103 
(0.108) 
 
0.126 
(0.112) 
 
0.128 
(0.110) 
 
HPI-rate_Lag-1 
 
 
 
-0.085 
(0.071) 
 
 
 
-0.052 
(0.070) 
 
HPI-rate_Lag-2 
 
 
  
-0.148** 
(0.069) 
 
-0.141** 
(0.062) 
 
Fixed Effect? 
 
 
Census 
Division 
 
Census 
Division 
 
Census 
Division 
 
Census 
Division 
 
Joint Significance 
of Census Division Effects 
 
χ2(8)=22.32 
(Pr~0.00) 
 
χ2(8)=23.81 
(Pr~0.00) 
 
χ2(8)=27.75 
(Pr~0.00) 
 
 
χ2(8)=28.00 
(Pr~0.00) 
 
 
Adj. R
2 
0.231 0.222 0.212 0.213 
N 728 678 628 628 
 
NOTES:  Models include a cubic function of time as the baseline hazard specification. Standard 
errors are reported within parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ imply 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
significance level. This analysis is done with all the states from 1984 to 2004.  
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Appendix A: 
Event Study Procedure: 
 
Following event study procedure is employed in this paper.  
 
Event:                            Adoption of the property condition disclosure law 
Outcome Variable:       quarterly HPI growth rate 
Event Window:             16 quarters before and 16 quarters after the adoption of the law.  
Sample:                         MSAs in 50 US states – 36 states adopted the law. 
Notations:                     Event time = 0;  
                                      Pre-event time periods = -1,…, -16; Post-event time periods = +1,…, +16                                
                                      HPI growth rate for treated MSA= h
T
                
                                      HPI growth rate for control MSA= h
C
 
                                      Abnormal Return = AR                 
                                      Cumulative Abnormal Return = CAR 
                                      MSAs = k;       Treated MSAs = i;    Control MSAs = j;     i ,j ∈ k 
 
 
Event Time-line: 
 
                   ---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------- 
                             -16      -12         -8         -4           0         +4           +8          +12       +16 
  
 
Step-1:    Estimating Propensity Score: Logit Model 
               { } { }ktktkt XlegalEXlegalXP ||1Pr)( ==≡  ≡ Propensity Scores 
               Where, legal= {0, 1} is the law adoption dummy, and Xit is vector of MSA (k)   
               economic characteristics and includes state-level institutional characteristics. Propensity  
               score is the conditional probabilities of adopting the disclosure law. The estimated  
               propensity score is obtained for each MSA in each quarter-year. 
 
 
Step-2:    For each treated MSA in respective event date, we find the closest match from the 
               group of control MSAs in terms of the estimated propensity score. So, the HPI growth  
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               rate of matched control MSA would be the benchmark from which we calculate the  
               deviations of the actual return or HPI growth rate of the treated MSA for each time 
               period in the event window.  
Step-3:    Calculating the Abnormal Returns (AR) 
 
               For a given treated MSA, i, and a matched control MSA, j, we obtain: 
 
               ( )CjTii hhAR 16,16,16 −−− −=  
                   . 
                   . 
               ( )CjTii hhAR 0,0,0 −=  
                   . 
                   . 
               ( )CjTii hhAR 16,16,16 +++ −=                                                                                                (14) 
 
We calculate the average (across treated MSAs) abnormal returns for each event date. 
 
Step-4:    Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
 
CAR is calculated as the cumulative aggregation of the average ARs. For example, for a three 
period CAR (i.e. within one period of the event date), we obtain, 
  
               [ ]101 +− ++= iii ARARARCAR                                                                                     (15) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
